erschien der 'Tractatus logico-philosophicus' unter dem Titel „Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung“ erstmals; ein Jahr später dann in deutsch-englischer. Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zählt zu den schwierigsten, aber auch einflussreichsten Werken des Jahrhunderts. Inhalt: Nur was in logisch. Über Bücher versandkostenfrei bei Thalia ✓»Tractatus logico-philosophicus«von Ludwig Wittgenstein und weitere Bücher einfach online bestellen!
Tractatus logico-philosophicusZum Anfang von Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus 77 ursprünglich überhaupt nicht mit ontologischen Fragen beschäftigen wollte, dies dann aber. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Tractatus logico-philosophicus (Klassiker Auslegen 10) (German Edition) eBook: Vossenkuhl, Wilhelm: my-bar-mitzvah.com: Kindle Store. Mr Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, whether or not it prove to give the ultimate truth on the matters with which it deals, certainly.
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Russell, datada de maio de Apesar de esta. Principies, p. Em lugar de referir-se aos fatos ou a uma. Como resolver esta enorme dificuldade?
Grundgesetze, 10, pp. Outros haveriam de con-tinuar seu trabalho. II — Os caminhos tortuosos de Russell. Examinemos porme-norizadamente essas questões na ordem em que foram enume-radas:a O primeiro ponto nos leva a retomar a dificuldadelevantada por Kerry.
O mesmoacontece, pois, com "todos os homens", "cada homem", 26 Ibid. Nada mais resta, portanto, do que postular 38 Ibid. This epistemic notion is further clarified by a discussion of objects or things as metaphysical substances.
His use of the word "composite" in 2. The notion of a static unchanging Form and its identity with Substance represents the metaphysical view that has come to be held as an assumption by the vast majority of the Western philosophical tradition since Plato and Aristotle , as it was something they agreed on.
Although this view was held by Greeks like Heraclitus , it has existed only on the fringe of the Western tradition since then.
It is commonly known now only in "Eastern" metaphysical views where the primary concept of substance is Qi , or something similar, which persists through and beyond any given Form.
The former view is shown to be held by Wittgenstein in what follows:. He attacks universals explicitly in his Blue Book. It is comparable to the idea that properties are ingredients of the things which have the properties; e.
And Aristotle agrees: "The universal cannot be a substance in the manner in which an essence is The concept of Essence, taken alone is a potentiality, and its combination with matter is its actuality.
Here ends what Wittgenstein deems to be the relevant points of his metaphysical view and he begins in 2. Whereas for Kant, substance is that which 'persists' i.
The further thesis of 2. This can be summed up as follows:. The 4s are significant as they contain some of Wittgenstein's most explicit statements concerning the nature of philosophy and the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown.
It is here, for instance, that he first distinguishes between material and grammatical propositions, noting:. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical.
Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language.
They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful. And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all.
A philosophical treatise attempts to say something where nothing can properly be said. It is predicated upon the idea that philosophy should be pursued in a way analogous to the natural sciences ; that philosophers are looking to construct true theories.
This sense of philosophy does not coincide with Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. The word "philosophy" must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.
Philosophy does not result in "philosophical propositions", but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.
It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be thought. Wittgenstein is to be credited with the invention or at least the popularization of truth tables 4.
If an argument form is valid, the conjunction of the premises will be logically equivalent to the conclusion and this can be clearly seen in a truth table; it is displayed.
The concept of tautology is thus central to Wittgenstein's Tractarian account of logical consequence , which is strictly deductive.
The nature of the inference can be gathered only from the two propositions. They themselves are the only possible justification of the inference.
At the beginning of Proposition 6, Wittgenstein postulates the essential form of all sentences. Proposition 6 says that any logical sentence can be derived from a series of NOR operations on the totality of atomic propositions.
Wittgenstein drew from Henry M. Sheffer 's logical theorem making that statement in the context of the propositional calculus. Wittgenstein's N-operator is a broader infinitary analogue of the Sheffer stroke , which applied to a set of propositions produces a proposition that is equivalent to the denial of every member of that set.
Wittgenstein shows that this operator can cope with the whole of predicate logic with identity, defining the quantifiers at 5.
The subsidiaries of 6. The final passages argue that logic and mathematics express only tautologies and are transcendental, i. In turn, a logically "ideal" language cannot supply meaning , it can only reflect the world, and so, sentences in a logical language cannot remain meaningful if they are not merely reflections of the facts.
From Propositions 6. The philosophy of language presented in the Tractatus attempts to demonstrate just what the limits of language are- to delineate precisely what can and cannot be sensically said.
Among the sensibly sayable for Wittgenstein are the propositions of natural science, and to the nonsensical, or unsayable, those subjects associated with philosophy traditionally- ethics and metaphysics, for instance.
Proposition 6. It would appear, then, that the metaphysics and the philosophy of language endorsed by the Tractatus give rise to a paradox: for the Tractatus to be true, it will necessarily have to be nonsense by self-application; but for this self-application to render the propositions of the Tractatus nonsense in the Tractarian sense , then the Tractatus must be true.
While the propositions could not be, by self-application of the attendant philosophy of the Tractatus, true or even sensical , it was only the philosophy of the Tractatus itself that could render them so.
This is presumably what made Wittgenstein compelled to accept the philosophy of the Tractatus as specially having solved the problems of philosophy.
It is the philosophy of the Tractatus, alone, that can solve the problems. Indeed, the philosophy of the Tractatus is for Wittgenstein, on this view, problematic only when applied to itself.
At the end of the text Wittgenstein uses an analogy from Arthur Schopenhauer , and compares the book to a ladder that must be thrown away after one has climbed it.
As the last line in the book, proposition 7 has no supplementary propositions. It ends the book with the proposition "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
A prominent view set out in the Tractatus is the picture theory, sometimes called the picture theory of language.
The picture theory is a proposed explanation of the capacity of language and thought to represent the world.
According to the theory, propositions can "picture" the world as being a certain way, and thus accurately represent it either truly or falsely.
This allows Wittgenstein to explain how false propositions can have meaning a problem which Russell struggled with for many years : just as we can see directly from the picture the situation which it depicts without knowing if it in fact obtains, analogously, when we understand a proposition we grasp its truth conditions or its sense, that is, we know what the world must be like if it is true, without knowing if it is in fact true TLP 4.
It is believed that Wittgenstein was inspired for this theory by the way that traffic courts in Paris reenact automobile accidents. In order to convey to a judge what happened in an automobile accident, someone in the courtroom might place the toy cars in a position like the position the real cars were in, and move them in the ways that the real cars moved.
In this way, the elements of the picture the toy cars are in spatial relation to one another, and this relation itself pictures the spatial relation between the real cars in the automobile accident.
Pictures have what Wittgenstein calls Form der Abbildung or pictorial form, which they share with what they depict. This means that all the logically possible arrangements of the pictorial elements in the picture correspond to the possibilities of arranging the things which they depict in reality.
This picturing relation, Wittgenstein believed, was our key to understanding the relationship a proposition holds to the world.
And that he thought, explains how we can understand a proposition without its meaning having been explained to us TLP 4. However, Wittgenstein claimed that pictures cannot represent their own logical form, they cannot say what they have in common with reality but can only show it TLP 4.
If representation consist in depicting an arrangement of elements in logical space, then logical space itself can't be depicted since it is itself not an arrangement of anything ; rather logical form is a feature of an arrangement of objects and thus it can be properly expressed that is depicted in language by an analogous arrangement of the relevant signs in sentences which contain the same possibilities of combination as prescribed by logical syntax , hence logical form can only be shown by presenting the logical relations between different sentences.
Wittgenstein's conception of representation as picturing also allows him to derive two striking claims: that no proposition can be known a priori - there are no apriori truths TLP 3.
Since all propositions, by virtue of being pictures, have sense independently of anything being the case in reality, we cannot see from the proposition alone whether it is true as would be the case if it could be known apriori , but we must compare it to reality in order to know that it's true TLP 4.
And for similar reasons, no proposition is necessarily true except in the limiting case of tautologies, which Wittgenstein say lack sense TLP 4.
If a proposition pictures a state of affairs in virtue of being a picture in logical space, then a non-logical or metaphysical "necessary truth" would be a state of affairs which is satisfied by any possible arrangement of objects since it is true for any possible state of affairs , but this means that the would-be necessary proposition would not depict anything as being so but will be true no matter what the world is actually like; but if that's the case, then the proposition cannot say anything about the world or describe any fact in it - it would not be correlated with any particular state of affairs, just like a tautology TLP 6.
Although Wittgenstein did not use the term himself, his metaphysical view throughout the Tractatus is commonly referred to as logical atomism.
While his logical atomism resembles that of Bertrand Russell , the two views are not strictly the same. Russell's theory of descriptions is a way of logically analyzing sentences containing definite descriptions without presupposing the existence of an object satisfying the description.
According to the theory, a statement like "There is a man to my left" should be analyzed into: "There is some x such that x is a man and x is to my left, and for any y , if y is a man and y is to my left, y is identical to x ".
If the statement is true, x refers to the man to my left. Whereas Russell believed the names like x in his theory should refer to things we can know directly by virtue of acquaintance, Wittgenstein didn't believe that there are any epistemic constraints on logical analyses: the simple objects are whatever is contained in the elementary propositions which can't be logically analyzed any further.
By objects , Wittgenstein did not mean physical objects in the world, but the absolute base of logical analysis, that can be combined but not divided TLP 2.
When combined, objects form "states of affairs. Facts are logically independent of one another, as are states of affairs. That is, one state of affair's or fact's existence does not allow us to infer whether another state of affairs or fact exists or does not exist.
Within states of affairs, objects are in particular relations to one another. The structure of states of affairs comes from the arrangement of their constituent objects TLP 2.
A fact might be thought of as the obtaining state of affairs that Madison is in Wisconsin, and a possible but not obtaining state of affairs might be Madison's being in Utah.
These states of affairs are made up of certain arrangements of objects TLP 2. However, Wittgenstein does not specify what objects are. Madison, Wisconsin, and Utah cannot be atomic objects: they are themselves composed of numerous facts.
Our language is not sufficiently i. Anthony Kenny provides a useful analogy for understanding Wittgenstein's logical atomism : a slightly modified game of chess.
Through Kenny's chess analogy, we can see the relationship between Wittgenstein's logical atomism and his picture theory of representation.
We can communicate such a game of chess in the exact way that Wittgenstein says a proposition represents the world. Or, to be more thorough, we might make such a report for every piece's position.
The logical form of our reports must be the same logical form of the chess pieces and their arrangement on the board in order to be meaningful.
Our communication about the chess game must have as many possibilities for constituents and their arrangement as the game itself. The logical form can be had by the bouncing of a ball for example, twenty bounces might communicate a white rook's being on the king's rook 1 square.
One can bounce a ball as many times as one wishes, which means the ball's bouncing has "logical multiplicity," and can therefore share the logical form of the game.
According to traditional reading of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein's views about logic and language led him to believe that some features of language and reality cannot be expressed in senseful language but only "shown" by the form of certain expressions.
Thus for example, according to the picture theory, when a proposition is thought or expressed, the proposition represents reality truly or falsely by virtue of sharing some features with that reality in common.
However, those features themselves is something Wittgenstein claimed we could not say anything about, because we cannot describe the relationship that pictures bear to what they depict, but only show it via fact stating propositions TLP 4.
Thus we cannot say that there is a correspondence between language and reality, but the correspondence itself can only be shown ,  : p56 since our language is not capable of describing its own logical structure.
However, on the more recent "resolute" interpretation of the Tractatus see below , the remarks on "showing" were not in fact an attempt by Wittgenstein to gesture at the existence of some ineffable features of language or reality, but rather, as Cora Diamond and James Conant have argued,  the distinction was meant to draw a sharp contrast between logic and descriptive discourse.
On their reading, Wittgenstein indeed meant that some things are shown when we reflect on the logic of our language, but what is shown is not that something is the case, as if we could somehow think it and thus understand what Wittgenstein tries to show us but for some reason we just couldn't say it.
As Diamond and Conant explain: . Speaking and thinking are different from activities the practical mastery of which has no logical side; and they differ from activities like physics the practical mastery of which involves the mastery of content specific to the activity.
To achieve the relevant sort of increasingly refined awareness of the logic of our language is not to grasp a content of any sort. Similarly, Michael Kremer suggested that Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing could be compared with Gilbert Ryle 's famous distinction between "knowing that" and "knowing how".
At the time of its publication, Wittgenstein concluded that the Tractatus had resolved all philosophical problems.
The book was translated into English by C. Ogden with help from the teenaged Cambridge mathematician and philosopher Frank P. Ramsey later visited Wittgenstein in Austria.
Translation issues make the concepts hard to pinpoint, especially given Wittgenstein's usage of terms and difficulty in translating ideas into words.
The Tractatus caught the attention of the philosophers of the Vienna Circle — , especially Rudolf Carnap and Moritz Schlick. The group spent many months working through the text out loud, line by line.
Schlick eventually convinced Wittgenstein to meet with members of the circle to discuss the Tractatus when he returned to Vienna he was then working as an architect.
Although the Vienna Circle's logical positivists appreciated the Tractatus , they argued that the last few passages, including Proposition 7, are confused.
Carnap hailed the book as containing important insights, but encouraged people to ignore the concluding sentences.
Wittgenstein responded to Schlick, commenting: " I cannot imagine that Carnap should have so completely misunderstood the last sentences of the book and hence the fundamental conception of the entire book.
A more recent interpretation comes from The New Wittgenstein family of interpretations under development since Rather, the book has a therapeutic aim.
By working through the propositions of the book the reader comes to realize that language is perfectly suited to all his needs, and that philosophy rests on a confused relation to the logic of our language.